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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of major demographic changes on the
housing market in the United States. The entry of the Baby Boom generation
into its house-buying years is found to be the major cause of the increase
in real housing prices in the l97Os. Since the Baby Bust generation is now
entering its house-buying years, housing demand will grow more slowly in the
1990s than in any time in the past forty years. If the historical relation
between housing demand and housing prices continues into the future, real
housing prices will fall substantially over the next two decades.
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The dramatic rise in the number of births in the 1950s and the
subsequent decline in the 1970s- -theBaby Boom and the Baby Bust- -are widely
recognized as among the most important changes in the United States in the
past 50 years. At the peak of the Baby Boom in 1957, 4.30 million babies
were born in the United States. The year before the boom began, in 1945,
2.86 million babies were born, and at the trough of the Baby Bust in 1973,
the figure was only 3.14 million. En this paper we examine how such major
demographic changes affect the market for housing.
Our goals are both retrospective and prospective. We want to assess
what impact these major demographic changes have had on the demand for
housing and, further, how these changes in demand have affected residential
investment and the price of housing. In addition, we want to assess what
more recent demographic pattetns imply about the housing market over the
next twenty years.
Our analysis of both cross-sectional and time-series data leads us to
three conclusions. First, large demographic changes of the sort we have
observed induce large (and mostly predictable) changes in the demand for
housing. Second, these fluctuations in demand appear to have substantial
impact on the price of housing. Third, recent demographic patterns imply
that housing demand will grow more slowly over the next twenty years than in
any time since World War II.
These findings have important implications fpr the public policy debate
over housing. Between 1970 and 1980 housing prices rose dramatically:
depending on the index, the real price of housing rose between 19 and 32
Ipercent. This development generated many calls for government intervention
to help provide more "affordable" housing. Our results indicate that this
increase in housing prices was i.argely attributable to the aging of the Baby
Boom. Over the next twenty years, the Baby Bust generation will be in its
house-buying years. As Kenneth Rosen (1984) has emphasized, this implies
that housing demand will grow more slowly in the future. Our estimates
suggest that real housing prices will fall substantially- -indeed,real
housing prices may well reach levels lower than those experienced at any
time in the past forty years.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin in Section II by documenting
the facts about the Baby Boom. We show the rise and subsequent decline in
births and discuss the extent to which these demographic changes were
predicted by contemporary observers.
In Section III we examine the link between age and housing demand.
Using cross-sectional data frém the Census for years 1970 and 1980, we find
that an individual generates little housing demand until age 20--that is,
children do not substantially increase a family's quantity of housing.
Housing demand rises sharply between ages 20 and 30, and remains
approximately flat after age 30. This finding implies that an increase in
the number of births has little immediate effect on the housing market, but
generates an increase in housing demand twenty years hence.
We examine in Section IV how demographic changes in the United States
have affected the demand for housing. We combine our cross-sectional
results on age and housing demand with time series on the age composition of
the population. We find that the Baby Boom of the 1950s led to rapid growth
in housing demand in the l97Os, and that the Baby Bust of the 1970s will
2lead to slow growth in housing demand in the 1990s.
In Sections V and VI we examine how housing demand affects the price of
housing and the amount of residential investment. Section V is in the
nature of an exploratory data analysis of the impact of changes in housing
demand. We are unable to detect a statistically significant relation
between demographic housing demand and the quantity of residential capital.
Residential investment is such a "noisy" time series that the standard
errors we obtain are very large. There is, however, a significant relation
between housing demand and the price of housing: a one percent increase in
housing demand leads to a five percent increase in the real price of
housing. We use this estimated relationship to examine how the slow growth
in demand over the next twenty years will likely affect housing prices.
In Section VI we use an intertemporal model of the housing market, in
the spirit of the one proposed by James Poterba (1984), to examine the
impact of changing housing demand. One implication of our findings is that
the Baby Boom caused an increase in housing demand in the l97Os that was
predictable far in advance. The model makes precise predictions about how
such a forecastable increase in demand should affect the housing market. We
examine what the model predicts and compare these predictions to experience.
We conclude that the housing market probably should not be characterized as
an efficient asset market in which prices reflect available information on
future demand.
II. THE FACTS ABOUT THE BABY BOOM
Figure 1, which graphs the number of births over time, shows the Baby
Boom very clearly. The low level of fertility during the Great Depression
3and the boom in births that lasted from 1946 to 1964 combine to produce a
sharp step in the population structure. As this step aged, it had effects
on the educational system, the labor market, the housing market, and the
social security system.
One way to look at the magnitude of the Baby Boom is to look at the
number of people at a given age. In 1960, 24.0 million people, or 13.3
percent of the population, were between ages 20 and 30; in 1980 the
corresponding number was 44.6 million, or 19.7 percent of the population.
Since this is the age in which people are forming new households and
increasing their demand for housing, it is clear that the boom should have
had a large effect on the housing market.
For our purposes, the exact cause of the Baby Boom is not important.1
That the bulge in the population was significant and could be expected to
move up through the age structure is clear enough that it does not need to
be defended. Whether the booni was seen as being temporary or permanent is a
tougher question to answer.
-
Figure2 presents the actual number of births per year from 1950
through 1983, and several contemporary forecasts made by the CensusBureau.2
The lesson to be learned from looking at these forecasts is that forecasting
births is a risky business. Any forecast of housing demand that depended
sensitively on births would be highly suspect. Luckily, as we shall show
below, forecasts of housing demand depend (as a first approximation) only on
the population above the age of 20. Thus, housing demand can be forecast 20
years into the future befote the unreliability of birth forecasts becomes a
problem.
4III. CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE DEMAND FOR HOUSINC BY ACE
We are interested in how housing demand is affected by changes in the
size of different age cohorts. We begin our examination of this issue by
using cross-sectional data to determine the link between age and the
quantity of housing demanded.
Looking across individuals, the quantity of housing demanded is a
function of age, income, and a variety of other household characteristics.
Yet here we use data on only the first of these attributes: age. Our
ultimate goal is to construct a variable on the aggregate demand for housing
given information only on the age composition of the population. We are
therefore not interested in the value of the true coefficient on age in a
multiple regression. Instead, we are interested in the best predictor of a
household's quantity of housing given information only on the age of its
members. Any correlation of age with income and other household
characteristics does not pose a problem- -indeed,multicollinearity may be a
strength, for it acts to eliminate any worry over the role of omitted
variables.
We model demand for housing by a household as an additive function of
the demand for housing of its members:
N
D—ED. (1)
where D. is the demand of the j-th member and N is the total number of
J
people in the household. To the extent that there are economies of scale in
the provision of housing services, this would not be the best way to
estimate the housing demand of a given household. Yet if we are interested
in predicting the housing demand of an entire population, and if the extent
5of household formation is fairly constant, then our approach should be
4
accurate.
The demand for housing of each individual is taken to be a function of
age.We allow each age to have its own housing demand parameter, so that
an individual's demand is given by:
D. —a DIJMMYO.+aDUMMY1. +•... + aDUMMY99. (2)
J 0 1 j 99
where DUMMYO—l if age—0, DUMMY1—l if age—i, etc. The parameter a. tells us
the quantity of housing demanded by a person of age i.
Combining (1) and (2) gives the equation for household demand:
0 —a EDUMMYO.+aEDUMMY1. +.... + aEDUNMY99. (3)
0 1 j 99 j
Weestimated (3) on a 1-in-bOO sample of the 1970 Census. The sample
consists of 203,190 individuals grouped into 74,565 households. The left
hand side variable is the value of the property for the unit in which the
household resides. For owner occupied units this is reported directly. In
the case of rental units, we used the approximation that the value is equal
to 100 times the gross monthlyrent.5 Leaving out units for which neither
of these figures was available, our sample consisted of 53,518 households.
The solid line in Figure 3 plots the estimated a's, while the estimates
themselves are in Appendix 1. Since the sample is so large, the standard
errors are extremely small (less than $300 for all of the estimates below
age 64). The dotted line in Figure 3 plots the a's forthe same regression
run on a sample from the 1980 Census, deflated into 1970 dollars by the GNP
deflator.
The primary feature of the estimates is a sharp jump in the demand for
housing between the ages of 20 and 30. As mentioned earlier, people below
the age of 20 have little impact on the demand for housing. The result is
6qualitatively the same for 1970 and 1980 data. In the work below we use
only the estimates from 1970.
A second feature of the results for both 1970 and 1980 is that the
quantity of housing demanded. appears to decline after age 40 by about one
percent per year. This decline is probably attributable to the fact that,
because of productivity growth, older cohorts have lower lifetime income
than younger cohorts and therefore demand less housing.
A third feature of Figure 3 is the large shift upward between 1970 and
1980. The real value of housing for an adult of any given age increased
almost 50 percent over this decade. Part of this increase is attributable
to productivity growth: real disposable personal income per capita rose 22
percent from 1970 to 1980. But much of the rise in house value must be
attributable to the 20 to 30 percent increase in the real price of housing.
As long as the price elasticity of housing demand is less than one, an
increase in the price of housing will increase the value of housing. The
large increase in age-specific house value between 1970 and 1980 thus
suggests that housing demand is fairly inelastic.
IV. SHIFTS IN HOUSING DEMANDDUETO THEBABYBOOM
Here we examine how changes in the age composition of the population
affect the demand for housing over time. Our approach is to assume that the
age structure of housing demand (that is, the set of a's estimated in the
last section) is constant over time. We can then see how the age structure
of housing demand interacts with shifts in the age structure of the
population.
6,7
More precisely, to obtain a measure that we interpret as the shift in
7housing demand due to demographics, we multiply the age structureof the
population by the coefficients estimated in (3.3) and sumfor all cohorts.
That is, if N(i,t) is the number of people of age i in year t, then housing
demand in year t is then
— a.N(i,t). (4)
We use the a's from the 1970 cross-sectional demand for housing. This time
series on housing demand, which is measured in millions of 1970 dollars, is
presented in Appendix 2. The growth rate of housing demand is plottedin
Figure 4. For comparison, we also present in Figure 4 the growth in housing
demand computed with the 1980 a's.
The arrival of the Baby Boom in the housing market., appears clearly as a
swelling in the rate of growth of demand that peaks around 1980. The rate
of increase in housing demand from 1940 to 1950 was 1.84 percent per year;
from 1950 to 1960, 1.16 percent; from 1960 to 1970, 1.31 percent; and from
1970 to 1980, 1.66 percent. Our forecast is that the rate of growth from
1980 to 1990 will be 1.33 percent per year; from 1990 to 2000, 0.68 percent,
and from 2000 to 2010, 0.57 percent.
It is instructive to compare our estimate of the growth in housing
demand with simpler demographic variables. Since our cross-sectional
estimates indicate a large increase in housing demand from age 20 to 30 and
approximate constancy thereafter, our time series on housing demand is not
very different from a time series on the adult population.The correlation
between the growth in the population, over 21 and the growth in our housing
demand variable is 0.86. Our estimate of housing demand is, however, very
different from the population including children. The correlation between
the growth in the total population and the growth in our housing demand
8variable is -0.57. Hence, although our housing demand variable is quite
similar to the adult population, it is not at all approximated by the total
population.
Figure 5 shows the forecasts of change in demand that would have been
made usir'g Census birth projections starting at various points in the-
postwar period. Despite the fact that birth projections were not very
accurate, in every case forecasted demand growth tracks actual demand growth
quite well for twenty years after the forecast is made. Because of the low
demand for housing of children, forecasts of total .ousing demand made in
the 1960s would have correctly predicted the increase in the rate of growth
of housing demand in the 1970s.
V. FROM HOUSING DEMAND TO PRICES AND QUANTITIES
In the last section we combined the cross-sectional results on age and
the quantity of housing demanded with time-series data on the age-
composition of the population to generate a new time series on housing
demand. This time series shows that the Baby Boom profoundly affected the
demand for housing in the l970s and that the Baby Bust will have the
opposite impact on the housing market over the next twenty years. Our goal
now is to examine the link between housing demand as measured by this time
series and developments in the housing market.
We take two approaches to examining how these fluctuations in housing
demand affect the housing market. Our first approach, which is pursued in
this section, is statistical and relatively atheoretical: we examine how our
time series on housing demand correlates with data on the housing market.
Our second approach, which is pursued in the next section, is more
9theoretically correct but is relatively data-free: we calibrate a variant of
Poterba's model of the housing market and examine how, according to that
model, large and predictable shifts in housing demand should affect the
housing market. We also examine the extent to which available evidence is
consistent with the model.
The reason we call the statistical analysis of this section relatively
atheoretical is that any good theory of the housing market must take into
account many subtle intertemporal issues. At any point in time, the stock
of housing depends on past flows of investment; the flow of investment
depends on the price of housing; the price of housing depends on current and
expected future rents; the rent depends on the stock and the state of
housing demand. While the model of the next section incorporates all these
feedbacks, here we ignore them. The goal of the exploratory data analysis
of this section is to see what stylized facts emerge.
Quantities
We begin by looking at whether there is any correlation between our
housing demand variables and the quantity of housing. We measure the
quantity of housing as the net stock of residential capital.8 In Table 1 we
regress the log of the stock of housing on a time trend and the log of our
demographic housing demand variable. We correct for serial correlation by
allowing the residual to follow a first-order autoregressive process, which
is estimated using an iterated Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.
The results are disappointing. The point estimate of the coefficient
for housing demand is near zero, but the standard error is extremely large.
We cannot reject that housing demand has no impact on the stock of housing.
10We also cannot reject that housing demand has a proportionate impact on the
stock of housing--that is, that the coefficient is one.
Residential investment is of course a highly cyclical component of CNP.
So perhaps it is not surprising that the standard error we obtain is large.
In an attempt to reduce the residual variance, and thus obtain more precise
estimates, we include the log of real GNP in column 2 of Table 1. As
expected, GNP enters significantly and positively. (Since the equation is
almost differenced, it is essentially relating residential investment- -the
change in the stock- -to the change in GNP. Thus, we are picking up the
investment accelerator.)The coefficient on demand and its standard error,
however, are not substantially tffected by correcting for the business
cycle.
The next correction we attempt is for the after-tax real interest rate,
which affects the user cost of hàusing and thus housing demand. The after-
tax real interest rate is (l-#) i -it, wherer is the marginal tax rate, i
is the nominal interest rate, and itisexpected inflation. We take r to be
0.3, i to be the yield on long-ten Treasury bonds9, and ittobe the average
rate of change in the GNP deflator over the past two years. When this
variable is entered into the regression, in Column 3 of Table 1, it is not
significant and does not alter any of the other estimates.
In summary, we cannot find a relation between our demographically
driven housing demand variable and the stock of housing. Yet we cannot
conclude there is no relation. Residential investment is just too "noisy"
to allow any firm inference.
11Prices
Next we examine whether there is any relation between our housing
demand variable and the price of housing. We run regressions analogous to
those above: we regress the log of the real price of housing on a time trend
and the log of our demographic housing demand variable. We also include the
log of real GNP and the after-tax interest rate to correct for other
macroeconomic effects.
The time series on housing prices we useisthe residential investment
deflator relative to the GNP deflator. It is diplayed in Figure 6. We
choose this series because it is available for a long sample. For the
period during which it overlaps with other existing series, such as that the
median sales price of existing single family houses collected by the
National Association of Realtors, the different series move closely
together. In particular, all series show real housing prices rising sharply
in the 1970s and relatively fIat in the 1980s.
In contrast to the results for the quantity of housing, the results for
housing prices are encouraging. The results in Table 2 show a strong and
highly significant relation between housing demand and the real price of
housing. In the full specification in Column 3, the coefficient on housing
demand is 5.3, which implies that a one percent increase in the demand for
housing leads to a 5.3 percent increase in the real price of housing. The
t-sèatistic on this coefficient exceeds 9--the correlation between our
housing demand variable and the price of housing is unlikely to be
10,11
spurious.
The strong association between housing demand and housing prices also
appears when one simply plots the data. Figure 7 shows the percentage
12change over the previous five years in the real price of housing and in our
housing demand variable. The demographic shifts appear to explain the
increase in housing prices around 1950, the fall around 1960, and the
housing boom throughout the l970s.
Our finding that shifts in housing demand have great impact on
housing prices suggests that both the supply and demand for housing are
highly inelastic. To see why, consider the following static model of
housing supply and demand
H5a+bP b>O
—c-dP+D d>O
where H is log qaantity of housing, P is log price, and ID is an exogenous
shift in demand.These two equations imply that
P (c-a)/(b+d) +(l/(b+d))D
For the coefficient on housing demand to be large, as we found in Table 2,
the sum of the supply elasticity and the demand elasticity (b+d) must be
small. Of course, the housing market is not adequately described in such a
static model. Yet even within dynamic models, such as that examined in the
next section, the substantial impact of demand on prices can only be
explained if supply and demand elasticities are small.
Since we have found a highly significant relation between housing
demand and housing prices, it is natural (at least for the heroic) to
extrapolate this relation forward to see what it implies for future housing
prices. As we have emphasized earlier, the changes in housing demand caused
by changes in birth rates are forecastable far in advance. Therefore, we
can be confident about our predictions regarding future housing demand.
The implication for future housing prices is perhaps apparent from
13Figure 7, which graphs the percentage increase in housing prices and the
percentage increase in housing demand. It shows that housing demand will
grow more slowly over the next twenty than at any time in our sample. If
the historical relation between demand and prices continues to hold, it
appears that the real price of housing will fall about 3 percent a year.
More formal forecasting using the regressions yields the same answer. The
regression in the first column of Table 2 implies that real housing prices
will fall by a total of 47 percent by the year 2007. Thus, according to
this forecasting equation, the housing boom of the past twenty years will
more than reverse itself in the next twenty.
At this point we should interject a note of caution about this
forecast. Every good student of econometrics can recite the perils of
forecasting beyond the experienäe of the data. The predicted growth of our
housing demand variable is lower than has been experienced over the past
forty years, and the period of low growth is protracted. Hence, we cannot
be confident about precisely what effects this slow growth will have. Yet
experience does tell us that slow growth in demand is associated with
falling prices. Even if the fall in housing prices is only one-half what
our equation predicts, it will likely be one of the major economic events of
the next two decades.
VI. HOUS INC DEMANDINAN INTERTEMPORAL MODEL
We now turn to examining the impact of changing demand in an
intertemporal model of the housing market. The model that we use is a
slight variation on that of Poterba (1984). In contrast to Poterba, we
ignore issues of taxation and of the effect of inflation on the cost of
14owning a home, and concentrate on the effects of changes in demand
attributable to demographic changes.
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The Elements of the Model
Let H be the stock of housing. We assume that the flow of housing
services is proportional to the stock of housing. The demand for housing is
given by the equation
Rd =f(R)N f'>O
where R is the real rental price and N is the adult population. N is a
shift variable which is meant to capture the effect of demographic changes
of the type discussed in Section IV. The market-clearing rent is thus given
by
R —R(h) R'<O
where h=H/N is housing per adult, and R(.) is the inverse of f(.).
We let P represent the real price of a standardized unit of housing.
(We ignore any distinction between land and structure.) For simplicity we
assume that the operating cost of owning a home is some constant, r, times
the value of the house. This constant is meant to incorporate the
opportunity cost of capttal, property taxes, maintenance, and depreciation.
The arbitrage condition for the path of housing prices is
R(h) —rP-P . (5)
This equation says that the rent must equal the user cost, which
equals the operating costs minus the capital gain. This implies
F— rP- R(h). (6)
This equation tells us how the price of housing evolves over
15time.
Gross investment in housing is taken to be au increasing function of the
price of housing and proportional to the scale of the economy as measured by
the adult population:
H+5H—(P)N *'>0
where & is the rate of depreciation. Let n be the rate of growth
of the population--that is, n—N/N. We can rewrite this equation






Population growth, n, thus enters as a shift variable in the model.
Figure 8 combines equations (6)and (7) to give the familiar phase plane
representation of the housing market. In steady state, the state variable h
and the costate variableP are constant. The arrows show the implied
dynamics of the economy when it is out of steady state. For any given value
of h, P jumps to the stable armandthe economy converges to the steady
state.
Simulating a Baby Boom
Now consider the effects of a hypothetical Baby Boom. Theeconomy is in
a steady state with growth at a rate of one percent per year. In
hypothetical year 1960 it is announced that from years 1970 through 1979,
the growth rate of the adult population will be twopercentper year, after
16which it will return permanently to one percent. As can be seen in the
phase diagram in Figure 9 the price of housing jumps up upon the
announcement, rises until sometime in the middle of the high growth period,
then gradually falls back to its steady state level.
To get a feel for the potential magnitude of the price changes, we
simulate the model under the assumption that the demand elasticity is 1/2,
the supply elasticity is 1, the operating cost r is 5 percent, and the
depreciation rate S is 2 percent. Although these supply and demand
elasticities are somewhat smaller than is generally accepted, we choose them
to generate large price responses. Rosen (1979) estimates that the
elasticity of demand is about 1.13 Poterba (1984) estimates that the supply
elasticity is between 0.5 and 2, while Topel and Rosen (1988) estimate that
the supply elasticity is about 3. After studying our base case, we will
consider the price responses generated by these alternative parameters.
The solid line in Figure 10 plots the simulated path of prices. We see
that upon the announcement of the Baby Boom, the-price of housing jumps
about three percent. From 1960 to 1970, the price rises about three percent
more in anticipation of the increased demand. The price rises an additional
one percent from 1970 to 1975, and then gradually falls back to the original
level. Thus, the price changes generated by the model under perfect
foresight are not very large, and almost all of the price rise takes place
before the increased demand arrives.
In assessing this forward-looking model of the housing market, it is
instructive to consider a simple alternative: suppose that market
participants are "naive" in the sense that, whatever the price of housing at
a given time, they expect it to remain constant at that level. If this is
17the case, there are no expected capital gains, and the price of housing is
determined simply by the rental market. That is,
P —R(h)/r.
In the phase diagram, the economy is always on the P —0schedule. One
simple consequence of this assumption is that the anticipation of a change
in demand growth can have no effect at all on the market.14
The dotted line in Figure 10 plots the simulated path of P under naive
expectations. In contrast to the forward-looking model, housing prices do
not begin to rise until the beginning of the period of high growth in 1970
and they reach their peak at the end of the period of high growth in 1980.
The price changes are also much larger. From 1970 to 1980, the price rises
by fourteen percent- -abouttwice as large as the total change under perfect
foresight.
In Table 3 we explore the effects of alternative assumptions about the
demand and supply elasticitieá on the path of prices, in both the forward-
looking and naive expectations models. The hypothetical Baby Boom that we
consider is the one described above. For each set of elasticity parameters,
we give the total amount of the price increase in each model, and for the
forward-looking model we also present the amount of the initial jump in
price and the level that the price has reached in 1970, just as the actual
boom in demand is beginning.
The result that almost all of the increase in price in the forward-
looking model takes place before the actual boom in demand arrives is quite
robust to the choice of elasticities. In no case that we look at does more
than one-fifth of the total increase take place after the boom has arrived.
The result that the total increase in price under the naive model is about
18twice as large as that under the forward-looking model is also robust.
Raising either the supply or demand elasticity lowers the total amount of
the price increase in either model. In general, alternative assumptions
about the supply and demand elasticities do not change the qualitative
properties of either model. Setting these elasticities as high as suggested
by some of the literature discussed above, however, does reduce the size of
the price increase in both models, but especially in the forward-looking
model, to near insignificance.
Does the Model Fit Experience?
While we do not formally test the forward-looking model of the housing
market, there are several reasons to think that it cannot come close to
fitting the data. First, consider the timing of the run-up in prices in the
1970s. Both housing prices and our housing demand series rose swiftly in
this decade. But the increase in demand growth could have been perfectly
predicted ten years in advance. In a forward-looking model, most of the
increase in prices should have taken place before the increase in demand
actually arrived.
Similarly, the forward-looking model does not properly capture the
timing of the turn-around in prices. An examination of Figure 7 shows that
housing prices peaked at almost exactly the time that the demand growth
began declining. The forward-looking model implies that prices should turn
down before demand growth. The model with naive expectations described at
the end of the last section, by contrast, does have the property that prices
turndown at the same time as demand.
Second, consider the magnitude of the price increase. The arbitrage
19condition in the forward-looking model makes it difficult for prices to rise
very quickly in the absence of news. The forward-looking model reacts to
our simulated "Baby Boom" with a price increase of seven percent -- farfrom
the 20 to 30 percent rise observed from 1970 to 1980. Again the model with
naive expectations comes closer to matching the facts: the total rise in
prices in response to a simulated Baby Boom in this model is much greater
than in the forward-looking model, and it takes place over a shorter period
of time.
As a means of salvaging the forward-looking model, one might argue that
the rise in prices in the 1970s was due not to the anticipated demand
increases in that decade but to the gradual arrival of "news" about future
demand growth. Figure 5 shows, however, that considering the arrival of
news only makes the forward-looking model look worse. The positive news
about demand in our sample period arrived during the 1950s, when it became
clear that the forecasts of bLrths made in the early 1950s were too low.
During the 1970s by contrast, the news that arrived was negative: the low
birth rates of the decade showed that earlier forecasts were too high. News
about births in the l970s should have made housing prices fall.
Is the HousinE Market an Efficient Asset Market?
Our simulation of the intertemporal model suggests that naive
expectations better characterizes the housing market than does perfect
foresight. In other words, the fluctuations in prices caused by
fluctuations in demand do not appear to be foreseen by the market, even
though these fluctuations in demand were foreseeable (at least in
principle). Thus, the arbitrage condition (6) appears not to characterize
20housing prices.
More direct tests also suggest that the housing market cannot be viewed
as an efficient asset market in which prices fully reflect available
information and returns are unforecastable. We can test the proposition
that real housing prices follow a random walk by regressing the change in
the log of housing prices on the change in the log of our demographic demand
variable. We obtain, with standard errors in parentheses;
A.log P —-0.06+4.7alog D
(0.02) (1.1)
N—40 D.W. —1.362 —0.30 s.e.e. —.0.016
Remember that this housing demand variable, which forecasts 30 percent of
real capital gains in housing, is known about 20 years in advance. Thus,
housing prices are not at all a random walk.
The failure of the random walk hypothesis for housing prices, however,
need not imply the failure of (6) and the existence of profit opportunities.
If the rent-price ratio moves in the opposite direction from the expected
capital gain, then the total return (rent and capital gain together) could
be unforecastable.En fact, using the CPI's component for rent, we find
that the rent-price ratio is negatively related to next year's capital
15
gain:
log P —0.03 -0.024R/P
(0.02) (0.018)
N—40 D.W. —0.99 B.2 —0.02 s.e.e. —0.019
Yet this statistical relation is very weak: the R2 is far smaller for the
rent-price ratio than for the change in demand. When both regressors are
included, we obtain:
21M.og P -0.11+ 5.8Alog D +0.024R/P
(0.04) (1.4) (0.019)
N—40 D.W. a1.412 —0.32 s.e.e. —0.016
The change in demand remains significant, while the rent-price ratio has the
wrong sign. In contrast to what an efficient market would require,the
rent-price ratio is not the best predictor of the capital gain. It is
possible, of course, that if we had better data on rents, we would find the
evidence more favorable to the efficient markets hypothesis. Based on the
available evidence, however, it seems that the housing market should not be
16 —
viewedas an efficient asset market.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have documented that changes in the number of births over time lead
to large and predictable changes in the demand for housing. These changes
in housing demand appear to have substantial impact on the price of housing.
If the historical pattern continues over the next twenty years, housing
prices will fall to levels lower than observed at any time in recent
history.
Does our finding imply that readers of this paper should sell their
homes and become renters? There are at least three reasons that such an
action may not be called for. First, there continue to be substantial
advantages to hoineownership. Some of these advantages are attributable to
the tax code and some are attributable to solving the principal-agent
problem that exists between landlord and tenant. Second, there is
substantial uncertainty about future housing prices. Not only are there
unforeseeable macroeconomic developments, but individual regions of the
country will experience housing booms or busts. The best way to hedge the
22uncertainty about future housing costs is to pay them in advance--that is,
to be a homeowner. Third, most homeowners have unrealized capital gains (at
least in nominal terms). Becoming a renter requires realizing these capital
gains and paying tax at a current rate of 28 percent. For these three
reasons, thnre is no easy way for the typical person to take advantage of
advance knowledge of a fall in housing prices.
What effect will the fall in housing demand have on the economy as a
whole? It is of course difficult to judge. Since it appears that current
housing prices do not fully reflect low future demand, the United States may
be currently overinvesting in residential capital. When such drop in demand
does become apparent, it is conceivable that we 'ill see a large and sudden
drop in housing prices and residential investment, which may be a potential
source of macroeconomic instability. Falling housing prices may also induce
increases in saving, as individuals perceive their housing equity as
insufficient to fund their retirement. The macroeconomic effects of falling
housing demand appear to be a fruitful topic for future research.
23Acoendix 1: The Cross-Sectional Estimates of Housing Demand by A2e
age a age a age a
0 857 34 9091 68 6694
1 1175 35 9006 69 7146
2 180 36 9608 70 6976
3 1066 37 9360 71 7233
4 110 38 9856 72 6918
5 385 39 8994 73 6660
6 371 40 9122 74 6896
7 340 41 9096 75 6968
8 221 42 9246 76 7012
9 244 43 9017 77 7816
10 211 44 9052 78 5416
11 10 45 8326 79 6635
12 188 46 8532 80 6716
13 143 47 8731 81 6343
14 536 48 8805 82 6652
15 392 49 8314 83 6627
16 639 50 7999 84 4666
17 911 51 8085 85 6506
18 1498 52 7901 86 5241
19 3065 53 7780 87 7614
20 3673 54 7699 88 6028
21 4623 55 7884 89 6347
22 5629 56 7528 90 8309
23 5578 57 7207 91 6407
24 6138 58 7645 92 6756
25 6678 59 7487 93 6091
26 7463 60 7893 94 6664
27 7647 61 7423 95 7222
28 8491 62 7871 96 3850
29 7453 63 7010 97 2716
30 8404 64 7964 98 4777
31 8130 65 7961 99 2318
32 8879 66 7654
33 8864 67 6591
Note: Estimates are for 1970, as described in text. a is expressed in
1970 dollars. Standard errors are in the range $180 to $225 for ages 0
through 27; $225 to $360 for ages 28 through 70; and remain under $1000
through age 87. The R-squared for this regression is 0.70.
24Appendix 2: The Time Series on Housing Demand CD)
1940701244 1971 1091308 2002 1566799
1941715990 1972 1108434 - 20031575496
1942731466 1973 1126025 2004 1584220
1943745519 1974 1145156 2005 1593669
1944760620 1975 1164476 2006 1603432
1945773894 1976 1183382 2007 1613635
1946788645 1977 1204403 2008 1622251
1947802574 1978 1224315 2009 1630538
1948816193 1979 1245966 2010 1639140
1949828924 1980 1267075 2011 1648877
1950841658 1981 1287339 2012 1658450
1951852629 1982 1307880 2013 1666729
1952865024 1983 1328015 2014 1673842
1953874894 1984 1347417 2015 1681571
1954885822 1985 1366484 2016 1688858
1955 896022 1986 1382844 2017 1696287
1956906033 1987 1399964 2018 1703310
1957915681 1988 1415691 2019 1708276







1965 1001255 1996 1513377
1966 1014264 1997 1522723
1967 1028125 1998 1531408
1968 1042675 1999 1540102
1969 1058925 2000 1548612
1970 1075162 2001 1557809
Note: Expressed in millions of 1970 dollars. Construction described in
text.
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26Table 1: Housing Demand and The Housinz Stock
Dependent Variable: log(stock)
Sample Period: 1947-1985
constant 8.01 5.14 4.99
(7.81) (6.35) (7.28)
time .0095 -.0006 -.0006
(.0366) (.0419) (.0436)




cost of funds -.00003
(.00073)
rho .971 .976 .976
(.035) (.031) (.034)
.9996 .9997 .9997
DW 1.28 1.13 1.13
see .00704 .00581 .00590
Standard errors are in parentheses.




constant -63.1 -70.3 -73.4
(9.2) (8.7) (7.9)
time -.065 -.078 -.081
(.010) (.010) (.009)




cost of funds -.0035
(.0021)
rho .770 .757 .690
(.102) (.114) (.109)
.940 .950 .952
DW 1.29 1.44 1.49
see .0152 .0139 .0136
Standard errors are in parentheses:
28Table 3: Forward-lookitw and Naive Forecasts Under AlternativeParameters







1/2 1/2 4.3 7.5 8.4 (1975) 15.8
1/2 1 3.2 5.9 6.6 (1975) 13.6
1/2 2
—
2.0 4.2 4.8 (1974) 10.2
1/4 1 4.1 8.6 9.9 (1974) 21.5
1/2 1 3.2 5.9 6.6 (1975) 13.6
1 1 2.1 3.7 4.1 (1975) 7.6
Note: All values are expressed in percent differences from the steady
state. The hypothetical Baby Boom modelled is an increase in the growth
rate of demand from one percent to two percent, lasting from 1970 to 1979,
this increase having been announced in 1960.
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1.Russell (1982) notes that the boom was caused by increases in the
number of women who married and the number of children per married woman,
and the fact that married women tended to have children earlier. In terms
of fertility, the boom can be •seen in the number of births per 1000 women
aged 15 through 44, which jumped from a depression low of below 80 to a peak
of above 120 around 1960, and fell to below 70 by 1980.
2.The Census Bureau generally provides several forecasts for births,
based on different assumptions about fertility. In cases where three
forecasts were made, we took the middle one; in cases where four were made,
we took the average of the middle two.
The series of actual births for the years before 1959 was
subsequently adjusted upward to reflect underregistration. The result is
that census forecasts are well below the actual number of births (even over
short horizons for which birth forecasts should be highly accurate). We
therefore adjust forecasts made before 1959 by a constant multiple computed
by assuming that the first year of any forecast was correct.
3. The 1983 forecast has been more accurate than most of its predecessors,
at least so far. Actual births in 1987 were 3,829,000, compared to a
forecast of 3,879,000.
4.Hendershott (1987) studies the effects of changes in the propensity to
form households on the demand for housing. We do not deny that such effects
are important, but our primary interest is in changes in demand that are
forecastable; we do not think that such changes are nearly as forecastable
as changes in the age structure of the population.
5. To test the robustness of this approximation, we ran (3.3) leaving out
rental units and also with the value/rent ratio set to 80, 90, 110, and
120. The results were quite similar to our baseline case.
6. To obtain the age structure of the population on an annual basis we
combined data on births with estimates of mortality. Actual births are used
through 1983, and the Census Bureau median forecast thereafter.
7. Our technique is similar to that employed by Hickman (1974); in place
of our estimated &s he uses age-specific rates of household headship.
8. End of year total net stock of residential capital, constant cost
valuation, from Fixed Reproducible TanEible Wealth. In this measure,
housing is valued at a base year price regardless of the price in the year
of acquisition -- thusit corresponds to a "physical volume" measure (and
not to price times quantity). In 1985 residential capital was made up of
67.9% owner occupied nonfarm; 27.9% private tenant occupied nonfarm; 1.7%
owner occupied farm; and 2.0% federal, state, and local.
309. From International Financial Statistics; from 1953 onward, these are 20
year constant maturities.
10.The results in Table 2 also show that the relative price of housing is
procyclical--a one percent increase in real GNP is associated with a 0.23
percent increase in the relative price of housing. While the point
estimates imply that high interest rates exert a depressing effect on
housing prices (a one percentage point increase in the after-tax real
interest rate depresses housing prices by 0.35 percent), this effect is not
statistically significant.
11. Replacing our demand variable with the adult population in the
regressions produces almost identical results. When both our demand
variable and the adult population are included, our demand variable works
slightly better as measured by the t-statistic or the size of the
coefficient. By contrast, when our demand variable is replaced with the
total population, the total population enters with the wrong sign. When
both our demand variable and the total population are included, the
coefficient on our demand variable remains positive and significant while
the coefficient on the total population is negative and insignificant.
Taken together, these time-series results strongly support the validity of
the housing demand variable generated from the cross-section estimates and
the conclusion that children generate little demand for housing.
12. The model we examine is partial equilibrium in nature. For a general
equilibrium treatment of some of these issues, see Manchester (1988).
13. Rosen's estimate, which is based on cross-sectional data, should
probably be considered a longnn elasticity. Over short horizons, perhaps
even as long as a decade, the demand elasticity is likely smaller. Moving
-
costsplay a key role here, since they make the demand elasticity zero for
many people. One weakness of the intertemporal model used here is that it
does not distinguish between long-run and short-run demand elasticities.
14. The essence of this naive model is that the quantity of housing
demanded depends on the current price of housing and-not on the anticipated
captial gain or loss. Other reasons beyond naivete can potentially explain
this behavior- -a binding borrowing constraint is one example.
15. Unfortunately, since we have only an index of rents, we cannot compute
the total return on housing and examine directly whether it is related to
our demand variable.. This also implies that the coefficient on RIP cannot
be easily interpreted. We should note that Apgar (1987) has argued that the
CPI for rent is a bad measure because of changes in the quality of the
rental units over time.
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